SOMETIMES
FOR A BUSINESS TO SUCCEED, a venture requires being in the
right place, at the right time, with the right product and the
right people behind it. In launching the United States
Football League, founder David Dixon felt he had each of these
firmly in place by May 11, 1982. Unfortunately, over the
course of its existence the USFL managed to take each of these
elements - one by one - and toss them aside.
The concept of the USFL was born from the mind of a Louisiana
antique dealer who believed America's appetite for professional
football was insatiable. David Dixon wasn't your typical
dealer of knick-knacks and old porcelain statuettes,
however. Dixon brought some measure of credibility with
his idea. He had been involved in pro football before,
having been instrumental in the founding of the NFL's New
Orleans Saints, as well as with the construction of the
Louisiana Superdome. So while some might have thought the
concept of a pro football league that played its games in the
spring was "crackpot" in nature, David Dixon's track
record gave him credibility that wouldn't have been afforded
others who had the vision.
Originally conceived in 1965, Dixon's concept for the USFL was
shelved for a decade and a half. During that time, Dixon
closely followed the paths of two other pro football leagues
that had come and gone: the American Football League of
the 1960's, which waged war head-to-head with the established
NFL and finally joined it on equal terms, and the World Football
League of the 1970's, which attempted to wage war with the NFL
but was the football equivalent of trying to take down a
battleship with spitballs.
The study in contrasts between the AFL and WFL was striking, and
it was one from which Dixon learned a great deal. The AFL
was well financed from its inception, with owners willing to
take financial hits for the long haul to establish their league
in the marketplace. The WFL was poorly financed from its
inception, with owners unable to take financial hits and hoping
to make a quick buck. The AFL placed its teams for the
most part in markets where the NFL didn't have a presence; the
WFL did the opposite, only to have teams move out of those
markets with disastrous results. The AFL landed a network
television deal, giving it credibility. The WFL didn't,
and seemed to lose credibility almost daily from its
inception. The AFL was well planned, the WFL wasn't.
Pro football
in 1980 was undergoing a surge in popularity, and Dixon felt the
time was right to launch the USFL. Commissioning a survey
on the subject of spring pro football by Frank Magid Associates,
the results were what Dixon wanted: there was, per the
study, "substantial support to the prospects for the USFL -
at the gate and in delivering television viewers to
advertisers." The report went on to say that "in
the fact of a long-standing reality (the existing NFL), the idea
of the USFL does very well." Armed with what became
known as the "Magid Study," Dixon began to woo
potential franchisees.
Dixon also had formulated a blueprint for the league's
operations. The USFL, playing in the spring, would need
early television exposure and revenue, sound financial
management through disciplined spending, owners willing to
absorb losses for several years in anticipation of long-term
financial success, and playing in a mix of cities with NFL teams
and without. Playing a spring schedule, Dixon surmised,
would allow USFL teams to play in NFL cities, as there was no
direct competition between them. Dixon subsequently
focused on putting teams in markets that would be attractive to
a potential television partner: New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, the Bay Area in California,
Florida, Washington DC, the deep south. With teams in
these locales, a national television deal could be more easily
secured.
Dixon's history with the Saints and the Superdome
notwithstanding, he knew that to open doors and add credibility,
the USFL concept would need the aid of football-minded men who
also saw his vision. He found one such man in former
Denver Bronco and Stanford University head coach John Ralston,
whom Dixon hired as the USFL's first full-time employee.
Respected in football circles, Ralston brought further
credibility to presentations made to potential franchise owners,
answering many of the "nuts and bolts" football
operations questions that would be asked.
In Dixon's original plan a league of at least 8, but no more
than 12 teams was envisioned in its first year. With
Ralston on board, the question of how many teams there would be,
and who would own them, started to take shape. Myles
Tanenbaum came on early and would head up the Philadelphia
franchise, former WFL owner John Bassett agreed to own a team on
the proviso that he could have exclusive rights to Florida, a
partnership of George Matthews and Randy Vataha took the Boston
franchise, and Oklahoma oilman J. Walter Duncan was awarded the
New York market following an abortive effort to get 35-year old
real estate mogul Donald Trump on board. Former Swiss
ambassador Marvin Warner would bring the USFL to Birmingham,
while real estate magnate A. Alfred Taubman would launch a team
in Detroit. Fellow real estate mogul Ron Blanding would
own the franchise in Denver, with respected attorney Berl
Bernhard heading up the Washington franchise. Phoenix
cardiovascular surgeon Dr. Ted Diethrich was awarded the Chicago
franchise, while Alex Spanos would be the USFL's man in Los
Angeles. Tad Taube and Jim Joseph would team up in
California's Bay Area, and cable television pioneers Bill
Daniels and Alan Harmon would head up California's third
franchise in San Diego. Dixon also held a franchise for
himself - payment for his involvement in organizing the
league. But Dixon opted to keep his team inactive for
1983, desiring instead to serve as the USFL's shepherd in its
maiden season; ultimately he would sell it to those who would
organize the Houston Gamblers for 1984, never putting a team on
the field himself.
But almost as soon as the lineup of initial USFL owners was in
place, it was breaking apart. The first chink in the
proverbial armor came when Spanos withdrew from the group,
opting instead to purchase a minority stake in the NFL's San
Diego Chargers (he would later become the team's majority
owner). Los Angeles was seen as a cornerstone market for
the USFL in terms of television, and having no team in the city
just wouldn't do. The owners of the Bay Area franchise
(later the Oakland Invaders), Jim Joseph and Tad Taube, came up
with a resolution: they'd flip a coin, with the winner
getting the L.A. franchise, the loser staying in the Bay
Area. Joseph won the toss, and the Los Angeles franchise
was his - for the time being.
Soon however another problem arose that put Los Angeles in
play. Bill Daniels and Alan Harmon, who had been awarded a
franchise for San Diego, were denied permission to lease Jack
Murphy Stadium for their team's games. Having two moguls
of the cable television industry placing a USFL franchise in the
nation's second largest television market made more sense than
having Jim Joseph owning a team there, so Joseph, who had began
his USFL journey as a part-owner in his home area of San
Francisco and took ownership of the Los Angeles franchise,
suddenly found his franchise on the move again - this time to
Phoenix, Arizona. It was far from what Joseph had
envisioned, but he remained committed to the concept of spring
football.
In September
1981, the owners named Detroit minority owner and former judge
Peter Spivak as interim commissioner, and retained Mike Trager,
a senior partner at Robert Landau Associates, to negotiate with
television networks regarding a potential USFL package.
Trager was an excellent choice, not only for his extensive
background in the television industry but also due to his
relationship with Chet Simmons, who was then the President of a
fledgling cable network, Entertainment and Sports Programming
Network (ESPN). Trager's efforts garnered interest not
only from ESPN on the cable side but also Turner Broadcasting
System (TBS), and on from over-the-air broadcast networks such
as ABC and NBC. Trager ultimately recommended that owners
reach agreement with ABC and ESPN, surmising that in ABC's case
the USFL would replace a stale Sunday afternoon sports lineup,
while in ESPN's case it would create "destination"
programming - giving the young cable network a flagship product
that would bring in viewers.
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